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ABSTRACT: This study finds that the financial press serves an important monitoring role by 
interpreting the tone of corporate announcements, moderating its impact to market participants 
in the process. Using textual analysis, we report that the press attenuates both the positive and 
negative tone of firm-initiated disclosures. However, the effect is asymmetric with the media 
mostly downplaying the tone of highly positive corporate press releases, consistent with the 
premise that management disclosures containing highly positive tone are less convincing. In 
addition, we find that the tone of the information produced by the financial media has an effect 
on market reactions above and beyond the impact of the linguistic content of corporate 
disclosures. Importantly, the impact of the linguistic content of corporate disclosures to market 
returns is moderated by the tone of new information included in media articles. Overall, this 
study adds new evidence to a growing body of literature suggesting that the tone of press-
originated articles contains incremental information content. 
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The informational role of the financial press in capital markets has received increasing attention 
in recent years. Several studies identify a speculative role of the press and question its validity 
as a distributor of key information to financial markets (Jensen 1979, Core et al. 2008, Ahern 
and Sosyura 2015). Other studies argue that the press plays a significant role in enriching a firm’s 
information environment, and hence serves as an important information intermediary (Miller 
2006, Bushee et al. 2010, Tetlock 2010, Peress 2014). Furthermore, a large body of empirical 
literature finds strong correlations and even causal effects between media activity and stock 
market reactions, which it interprets as evidence of media usefulness to market participants 
(Engelberg and Parsons 2011, Dougal et al. 2012, Peress 2014, Rogers et al. 2016). This study 
tackles the question of the informational role of the press by investigating whether the linguistic 
characteristics extracted from the textual content of press-generated articles have incremental 
information content compared to that of firm-originated disclosures. Prior research examines the 
management- and media-issued content independently (Tetlock et al. 2008, Loughran and 
McDonald 2011b, Davis et al. 2012, Demers and Vega 2014). In contrast, we provide insights 
into the role of the financial press in the information transmission process relative to corporate 
disclosures. This not only allows us to identify the role of the press in analysing firm disclosures 
but also helps us offer direct evidence about the value of press-issued information to market 
participants by comparing the market reactions to firm-initiated and press-initiated related 
articles. 
Managers use press releases to communicate information about their firms to market 
participants. They often choose to complement disclosures of quantitative performance with 
qualitative information; in fact, the use of optimistic or pessimistic language throughout financial 
disclosures can be a tool for managers to either improve investors’ perceptions of firm 
fundamentals (Davis et al. 2012, Demers and Vega 2014) or misinform them (Huang et al. 2014). 




an information intermediary by broadly disseminating the key points of the news releases, by 
packaging information together from multiple sources, and by producing new information; in 
this way, the press mitigates asymmetry between differentially informed market participants 
(Bushee et al. 2010). In light of management’s strategic reporting incentives to emphasise good 
or bad news in order to influence investors’ perceptions about the firm upward or downward 
(Davis and Tama-Sweet 2012, Huang et al. 2014, Allee and Deangelis 2015), we expect financial 
journalists to offer a more balanced coverage when disseminating firm-initiated news, and thus 
to appear more prudent compared to firm managers. We refer to this as the interpretative role of 
the press. In addition, consistent with the financial press providing new material information to 
the investor community, we expect the linguistic content of financial media articles to be 
informative to market participants over and above that of corporate disclosures. Furthermore, we 
argue that the tone of new information included in the media articles is likely to moderate the 
impact of the linguistic content of corporate disclosures to market returns. We refer to this as the 
moderating role of the press. 
Using a sample of over 27,000 financial performance-related disclosures issued by the 
constituent companies of the Standard and Poor’s 500 index between January 2000 and 
December 2013, and over 74,000 related articles in the financial press from the Factiva database, 
we employ textual analysis to measure the tone of management- and media-issued content. 
Specifically, we create tone measures for corporate press releases and financial journalists’ 
articles based on two general dictionaries, namely Diction 7 and LIWC 2015, and two finance-
customised word lists developed by Henry (2008) and Loughran and McDonald (2011b). Our 
findings suggest that there is a significant positive association between the tone of firm-initiated 
disclosures and the tone of media articles about the firm, consistent with the information 
dissemination role of the media. Importantly, the financial press attenuates the tone of corporate 
disclosures, in keeping with its interpretative role. Even though the results hold both for positive 




with the premise that management disclosures containing highly positive tone are less 
convincing. We also present evidence that the market reaction on the day the corporate 
announcement and associated media articles are published is strongly related to ‘abnormal media 
tone’, that is, media tone that cannot be explained by press releases’ tone or other firm 
characteristics, thus likely capturing the tone from new information generated by the media. This 
result is consistent with two alternative, non-mutually exclusive explanations. The first is that 
abnormal media tone is a driver of the market reaction to the news in the firm’s press release. 
The second explanation is that abnormal media tone reflects the economic news contained in the 
firm’s press release and other news entering the market price on that day. It is quite possible that 
the above result is due to a mixture of both explanations.1 Importantly, we also find that abnormal 
media tone moderates the market reaction to the linguistic content of corporate disclosures, 
consistent with the moderating role of the press. 
Given the focus of the extant literature on earnings release announcements (e.g., Rogers 
et al. 2011, Huang et al. 2014, Henry and Leone 2016) and the fact that the vast majority (i.e., 
approximately 70%) of corporate press releases in our sample are earnings announcements, we 
distinguish between ‘earnings press releases’ and ‘other (non-earnings) press releases’. Our 
findings indicate that the financial press attenuates the tone of both earnings and non-earnings 
press releases. The effect is asymmetric for both types of firm announcements, with the media 
mostly downplaying highly positive (earnings and non-earnings) press releases. However, this 
effect is more pronounced for non-earnings press releases compared to earnings announcements. 
One could argue that managers have more discretion over the content of non-earnings disclosures 
compared to earnings-related ones, which are typically highly anticipated and scrutinised. Thus, 
the monitoring role of the media might be more important in non-earnings disclosures; our results 
are consistent with this conjecture. These findings have important implications with regards to 
 




the perceived credibility of different types of corporate disclosures and further highlight the 
monitoring role of the financial press. 
An important argument in this study is that the media responds to corporate disclosures 
by publishing articles that reflect but also attenuate the tone of these disclosures. In Section 4.4.3, 
we use data on corporate disclosure and media article timings and show that reverse causality is 
not likely to explain our results. We also use a propensity score matching design to alleviate 
endogeneity concerns related to selection on observable characteristics (Shipman et al. 2017), 
and provide evidence that our inferences are not likely to be driven by confounding factors that 
determine the tone of both management- and media-issued content. We note here that throughout 
our analysis we include day of the week, month, year and firm fixed effects to capture 
unobservable heterogeneity, that is, control for the effect of unobservable variables that are 
constant over time as well as unobservable variables that are constant across firms. Still, we 
acknowledge that we cannot completely rule out the impact of omitted variables on our findings. 
However, we argue that collectively our results point to a causal effect of the tone of corporate 
press releases on the tone of media articles about the firm.  
This study contributes to the extant academic literature along several dimensions. First, 
our paper is a response to the call by Miller and Skinner (2015) for investigation into the role of 
the media in financial markets, and offers robust evidence supporting the view that the financial 
press serves a monitoring role. In particular, on top of its information dissemination role, the 
media has an attenuation effect on the tone of corporate announcements. Second, our study 
relates to the literature that uses word-frequency measures to quantify the tone of corporate 
disclosures’ and media articles’ textual content. Unlike prior studies, we do not explore these 
two sources of information separately. Instead, we investigate the importance of the financial 
press in the information transmission process relative to firm disclosures, and find that abnormal 
media tone informs market reactions and moderates the impact of firm disclosure tone to market 




that financial journalists view management’s favourable non-earnings disclosures with more 
scepticism compared to unfavourable (earnings or non-earnings) disclosures. Importantly, we 
also find that the press treats favourable non-earnings press releases with more suspicion 
compared to favourable earnings announcements. Finally, we make a methodological 
contribution to the literature on the textual analysis of financial information. Our analysis 
requires the classification of news as either press-generated or company-initiated and, as 
discussed in Section 3.3, our methodology is effective in distinguishing between the two 
mediums of disclosure dissemination and in accurately classifying articles. Overall, this study 
adds new evidence to a growing body of literature suggesting that media content, positive and 
negative, has incremental information. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 develops the paper’s motivation 
in the context of the extant literature, and states our main hypotheses. Section 3 describes our 
research design, sample selection and data. Section 4 presents the main results and findings from 
sensitivity tests of our primary analysis. Section 5 summarises the paper. 
 
2. Related Research and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 The Role of the Financial Press as an Information Intermediary 
Information asymmetry and agency conflicts between informed and uninformed market 
participants are mitigated through financial reporting and disclosure (Kothari et al. 2009a). 
Disclosures by information intermediaries potentially play a significant role in reducing further 
information differences and conflicting incentives between a firm’s managers and its external 
stakeholders (Healy and Palepu 2001). As mentioned above, prior academic research often 
provides conflicting evidence about the value of the financial press as an information 
intermediary in the capital markets. On the one hand, there is evidence that the press plays a 
speculative role and, in their attempt to compete for readership, media outlets face incentives to 




et al. 2008, Ahern and Sosyura 2015). On the other hand, some studies demonstrate that the 
media plays a significant role as a distributor of key information in financial markets (Tetlock 
2010, Engelberg and Parsons 2011, Peress 2014). Dyck and Zingales (2002) and Miller (2006) 
suggest that the press has an investigative reporting role, and undertakes original investigation 
and analysis. According to this strand of literature, the financial press is increasingly recognised 
as a key player in enriching the firm’s information environment. 
 
2.2 The Relation between the Media and Stock Market Reactions 
A large and growing body of literature has investigated the association between media activity 
and stock market activity (Klibanoff et al. 1998, Huberman and Regev 2001, Tetlock 2007, 
Peress 2008, Fang and Peress 2009). For example, Twedt (2016) shows that the market response 
is stronger for management earnings guidance when the guidance is disseminated through the 
financial press. Several recent studies extend this literature by documenting a causal effect of the 
media on trading activity and price formation (Engelberg and Parsons 2011, Dougal et al. 2012, 
Drake et al. 2014, Peress 2014). Rogers et al. (2016) use the process through which insider 
trading filings are made public to focus on the dissemination role of the media, given that media 
articles covering insider filings typically reiterate factual information in the filings. Their 
evidence suggests that the media plays a significant role in price formation by disseminating 
news more widely. Blankespoor et al. (2017) also examine the media’s synthesis and 
dissemination role, and provide evidence consistent with algorithmic ‘robo-journalism’ articles, 
that is, automated articles about firms’ earnings releases introduced by the Associated Press, 




2 The Associated Press introduced the ‘robo-journalism’ technology in 2014; therefore, it is not relevant to our 




2.3 Tone Analysis of Corporate Disclosures and Media Articles 
There is growing research in accounting and finance that employs linguistic analysis tools to 
analyse the qualitative information of corporate disclosures and media articles (Huang et al. 
2014).3 These studies typically examine whether the various qualitative dimensions of the 
disclosures (e.g., positive versus negative tone) contain incremental information content, or 
investigate factors that result in cross-sectional differences in the disclosure tone (Henry and 
Leone 2016). The literature that uses textual analysis on firm-initiated disclosures/filings, such 
as the Management Discussion & Analysis section (MD&A) of 10-K and 10-Q filings and 
earnings announcements, is extensive (Kothari et al. 2009a, Loughran and McDonald 2011a, 
2011b, Davis and Tama-Sweet 2012, Price et al. 2012, Davis et al. 2015, Loughran and 
McDonald 2015). For example, Davis et al. (2012) and Henry (2006, 2008) document an 
association between earnings announcement returns and the tone of the announcement. Using a 
sample of non-earnings 8-K filings, Segal and Segal (2016) provide evidence that managers 
engage in strategic reporting by delaying and obfuscating the release of negative news. Overall, 
the above studies show that the tone of corporate disclosures is related to both current and future 
firm performance as well as strategic incentives. 
Important work on tone analysis of press-initiated articles includes Chen et al. (2014), 
Core et al. (2008), Hooghiemstra et al. (2015), Sinha (2016), Tetlock (2007), and Tetlock et al. 
(2008). Kothari et al. (2009a) study the impact of disclosures by management, analysts and news 
reporters on the firm’s capital market environment. They show that positive (negative) media 
coverage results in decreased (increased) cost of capital, stock return volatility, and analyst 
forecast dispersion. Garcia (2013) studies the relationship between the tone of financial news 
from the New York Times and stock returns during 1905 to 2005, and demonstrates that the 
predictability of stock returns is concentrated in economic downturns. Ahmad et al. (2016) 
 
3 See Loughran and McDonald (2016) for an overview of textual analysis in accounting and finance. Kearney and 




conduct a time-varying analysis of the relation between media-expressed firm-specific tone and 
firm-level returns, and find that, rather than being a source of noise, media content can sometimes 
contain new fundamental information about firm value. 
 
2.4 Hypotheses Development 
Managers recognise the importance of press releases as a means of communicating information 
about their firms, while this disclosure channel also allows them to manage their firms’ 
information environments by exercising discretion over what to disclose and when to disclose it 
(Miller and Skinner 2015). Since the information contained in corporate press releases is 
typically price sensitive and important to the investor community, this creates scope for the 
media to respond to it and facilitate communication between managers and investors by serving 
as a useful information intermediary; specifically, the media is expected, not only to rebroadcast 
and broadly disseminate material and accurate information contained in firm disclosures, but 
also to produce new relevant information that is useful to other parties (Bushee et al. 2010, Drake 
et al. 2014, Dai et al. 2015). Through these activities, the financial press acts as an external (to 
the firm) monitoring mechanism and reduces information asymmetry between managers and 
investors (Miller and Skinner 2015, Rogers et al. 2016). Evidence reveals that managers’ use of 
positive or negative language is likely to influence market participants’ perceptions about firm 
performance (Davis et al. 2015). Consistent with the information dissemination role of the 
financial press, optimistic or pessimistic tone expressed in corporate disclosures is naturally 
expected to also have an effect on journalists’ tone used in related articles in the financial press. 
In other words, we expect that the linguistic content of financial performance-related corporate 
disclosures is associated with the linguistic content of subsequent financial performance-related 
media articles about the firm. Thus, we conjecture that the tone of financial media articles on 
trading day t exhibits a consistent positive association with the tone of firm disclosures to which 





There is a significant positive association between the tone of financial performance-related 
corporate press releases and the tone of financial performance-related media articles about the 
firm. 
 
The disclosure literature suggests that managers face incentives to report strategically 
and frequently use qualitative statements to present information in a more favourable manner 
(Rogers et al. 2011, Davis and Tama-Sweet 2012, Huang et al. 2014). Qualitative disclosures, 
by nature, provide managers with opportunities to exercise discretion. For example, Davis and 
Tama-Sweet (2012) find strong (limited) evidence that managers report less pessimistic (more 
optimistic) language in earnings press releases relative to MD&A disclosures when facing 
strategic reporting incentives. In light of management’s incentives to report good news,4 Kothari 
et al. (2009a) argue that management’s positive disclosures may not be credible to the investment 
community. Additionally, Kothari et al. (2009b) provide evidence that managers, on average, 
tend to accumulate and withhold bad news up to a certain threshold. Allee and Deangelis (2015) 
study the extent to which tone is evenly dispersed throughout the managers’ disclosure narrative 
in earnings conference calls, and suggest that managers draw attention to bad news and away 
from good news in order to smooth expectations of extreme performance. Given the above 
findings, we posit that, apart from being informative (Davis et al. 2012, Demers and Vega 2014), 
the tone of corporate communications can also be a tool for managers to influence investors’ 
perceptions of and expectations about the firm. Importantly, Huang et al. (2014) show that the 
disclosure tone of earnings press releases contains a non-discretionary component that reflects 
economic fundamentals, and a discretionary component that reflects managerial strategic choice 
of tone to misinform investors. They contend that managers may engage in opportunistic tone 
 





management ‘by being unduly positive or negative relative to the reported quantitative 
information even when this leads to a less accurate perception of fundamentals’ (p. 1084). 
Bearing in mind the media’s monitoring role of firms’ activities (Miller 2006, Miller and Skinner 
2015), we anticipate the tone of financial media articles to be correlated with the ‘true’ 
component of corporate disclosure tone, that is, the tone that reflects fundamental performance, 
and uncorrelated with the component of tone that captures managerial strategic discretion (i.e., 
spin) or noise. In other words, we expect the media to interpret the tone of corporate disclosures. 
Assuming the financial press offers a balanced and informative representation of corporate 
disclosures, one would expect it to attenuate the exceedingly positive or highly negative tone of 
corporate announcements. 
Furthermore, the media’s ultimate objective is to attract greater readership (Bushee et al. 
2010). This gives journalists an exceptional interest in enhancing their fame and reputation 
(Fengler and Ruß-Mohl 2008), which increase visibility and ultimately readership. Given that 
the media’s business model places great value on reputation, we argue that financial journalists 
are likely to face asymmetric reputational costs for inaccuracy in disseminating information 
included in corporate disclosures. We conjecture that the reputational cost of not seeing through 
biased managerial information should be much higher to the media compared to the cost of 
appearing too prudent.5 Thus, one should expect that the media adopts a more prudent tone 
relative to the corporate disclosure tone.  
Considering the above discussion and managers’ tendency to either put a positive spin 
on reported performance or engage in ‘big bath’ reporting, we predict that financial journalists, 
in their effort to offer balanced coverage, attenuate the tone of highly positive or overly negative 
firm press releases. Consequently, we construct the following hypothesis: 
 
 
5 Financial analysts are other information intermediaries that also have asymmetric loss functions (Clatworthy et al. 





The financial media attenuates the tone of financial performance-related corporate press releases. 
 
As discussed in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, several prior papers relate the tone expressed in 
various corporate disclosures to measures of firm profitability, financial market outcomes as well 
as managerial opportunistic behaviour. A number of studies also examine the market reaction to 
press-issued textual content, suggesting that the financial press plays a substantive role in the 
equity markets (Bushman et al. 2017). Building on this line of research, we quantify textual 
content emanating both from corporate press releases and related financial media articles about 
the firm, and examine whether abnormal (i.e., residual) media tone, that is, media tone above 
and beyond what corporate press releases’ tone and various firm characteristics can explain, is 
incrementally informative to the market. Abnormal media tone is likely to capture the tone of 
new information generated by financial journalists, consistent with the information creation role 
of the financial press (Bushee et al. 2010). We naturally expect the underlying corporate event 
or information (‘economic news’) to be correlated with the corporate disclosure’s and related 
media articles’ tone; still, if financial media articles provide new information over and above that 
provided by the firm or other information intermediaries, we expect abnormal media article tone 
to be a significant determinant of the market reaction to the underlying economic news about the 
firm on the announcement day. This association would be consistent with either the abnormal 
media tone being a driver of market reaction to the news included in the press release or the 
abnormal media tone capturing the economic news about the firm, which also drive the market 
reaction. Therefore, we examine the informativeness of abnormal media tone after controlling 
for the tone of firm announcements. Thus, assuming market efficiency and controlling for the 
tone of corporate press releases issued on trading day t, we conjecture that the market reaction 








Controlling for the tone of financial performance-related corporate press releases, the market 
response to the corporate press releases is positively related to the abnormal component of tone 
of financial performance-related media articles about the firm. 
 
Consistent with the media’s information creation role (Bushee et al. 2010), the tone of 
new information produced by the media is expected to influence the firm information 
environment incrementally to the effect of firm-initiated disclosures, thus, we predict that 
abnormal media tone affects price reactions significantly. Furthermore, we argue that abnormal 
media tone has a moderating impact on the effect of corporate press release tone on stock market 
reactions, since market participants react to the tone of this new information procured by the 
media and not only to the tone of the corporate press release. The greater the abnormal media 
tone is the higher its impact on market participants, hence, the lower the ability of the tone of 
corporate press releases to influence price reactions. In other words, although prior research 
documents a positive association between the tone of firm-initiated disclosures and the market 
response to these disclosures (e.g., Davis et al. 2012, Henry and Leone 2016), we expect press 
release tone to matter less to market participants when the tone of new information provided by 
the media is more positive. In fact, prior literature broadly documents that financial media 
coverage tends to be negative (Tetlock 2007, Core et al. 2008, Ahern and Sosyura 2015), while 
Tetlock (2007) proposes that high levels of media pessimism could be associated with 
noninformational trading or risk aversion. Thus, we expect that market participants are likely to 
react more to abnormal media tone relative to corporate press release tone when abnormal media 




of media tone is value relevant to market participants, we further hypothesise that the financial 
press plays a moderating role, that is, abnormal media tone affects (i.e., moderates) the strength 
of the relation between corporate press release tone and market responses. As such, controlling 
for the tone of corporate press releases issued on trading day t and the abnormal component of 
the tone of press-initiated articles issued on the same day, we conjecture that the market reaction 
to the corporate press releases is negatively correlated with the product of abnormal media tone 
and corporate press release tone. 
 
Hypothesis (2b) 
The market response to the tone of financial performance-related corporate press releases is 
moderated by the abnormal component of tone of financial performance-related media articles 
about the firm. 
 
3. Research Design, Sample Selection and Data 
3.1 Quantifying Tone 
Similar to prior research, we employ a form of content analysis that involves counting words 
characterised as ‘positive’ or ‘optimistic’, and ‘negative’ or ‘pessimistic’, based on predefined 
word lists. This approach, known as the dictionary or rule-based approach, entails using a 
mapping algorithm in which a computer program classifies the words of a document into groups 
based on predefined categories (Li 2010, Henry and Leone 2016). 
 
3.1.1 General and Domain-Specific Word Lists 
We examine four word lists used in capital markets research to compute a tone measure: a 
domain-specific word list developed in Loughran and McDonald’s (2011b) analysis of the 
MD&A section of 10-K filings (LM); a domain-specific word list developed in Henry’s (2006, 




Inquiry and Word Count 2015 software (LIWC); and a general word list from the Diction 7.0 
software (Diction). The LM and Henry word lists are specific to the domain of financial 
communication, while the Diction and LIWC word lists have been applied in a wide variety of 
settings, including presidential speeches (Bligh et al. 2004) and newspaper articles 
(Hooghiemstra et al. 2015). 
Our choice to use the LM, Henry, Diction and LIWC word lists is motivated by the fact 
that the extant accounting and finance literature uses extensively both general and finance-
specific word lists. Li (2010) and Loughran and McDonald (2011b, 2015) criticise the use of 
general word lists to calculate tone in the context of corporate filings, because these dictionaries 
have not been created with financial text in mind. For example, Loughran and McDonald (2015) 
show that approximately 83% of the Diction optimism and 70% of the Diction pessimism word 
frequencies appearing in a large 10-K sample suffer from the potential word misclassification 
problem. Henry and Leone (2016) also suggest that capital markets researchers aiming to 
measure the tone of financial narrative can increase the power of their tests by using domain-
specific word lists, such us the LM and Henry dictionaries. Nevertheless, Davis et al. (2015) 
argue that ‘there is currently no consensus in the literature regarding which one [word list] is 
the most appropriate for the analysis of tone in contexts such as financial disclosures’ (p. 645). 
In addition, Loughran and McDonald (2016) highlight that the application of the LM dictionary, 
which is specific to the context of 10-K filings, is likely to be problematic without modification 
to other media. We note that this is not the case in our setting, since we focus on press releases 
and media articles related to firms’ financial performance. In particular, Loughran and McDonald 
(2011b) examine the generalisability of their word lists to other financial documents, and argue 
that their lists could be applied successfully to other documents, such as newspaper articles or 
press releases. 
We create average tone measures for press releases and related media articles, based on 




we also report our main results based on each tone score separately, which helps us examine the 
extent to which our inferences are sensitive to the use of general and domain-specific 
dictionaries. 
 
3.1.2 Construction of Tone Measures  
We attempt to decipher media articles’ and press releases’ tone by using frequency counts of 
positive and negative words from the Diction, LIWC, Henry and LM dictionaries. Diction does 
not have direct sentiment categories of positive and negative words; hence, we follow Davis et 
al. (2012), Loughran and McDonald (2015), and Rogers et al. (2011), and extract the optimism-
increasing words tabulated in the three subgroups of praise, satisfaction, and inspiration, and the 
optimism-decreasing words tabulated in the three subgroups of blame, hardship, and denial. The 
word lists from Diction include 677 unique optimistic (hereafter positive) and 904 unique 
pessimistic (hereafter negative) words. The LIWC word lists contain 620 positive emotion 
(hereafter positive) and 744 negative emotion (hereafter negative) words. The Henry word list 
includes a total of 104 positive and 85 negative words. The positive and negative LM word lists 
contain 354 and 2,355 words, respectively. 
For each media article (press release), we compute alternative tone measures. We have 
developed an algorithm in Java that counts the number of positive and negative words for each 
media article and press release separately. Specifically, the tone of media article i (press release 
j) is measured alternately using the LM, Henry, Diction, and LIWC word lists as the difference 




          (1) 
and 
 
6 We follow Henry and Leone (2016) in estimating tone in equations (1) and (2). As an alternative measure, we 
define media articles’ and press releases’ tone scores as the difference between positive and negative words, scaled 







          (2) 
where MATonei,s is the tone measure for media article i, based on word list s (i.e., MATonei,LM, 
MATonei,Henry, MATonei,Diction, MATonei,LIWC); PRTonej,s is the tone measure for press release j, 
based on word list s (i.e., PRTonej,LM, PRTonej,Henry, PRTonej,Diction, PRTonej,LIWC); POSi,s (POSj,s) 
is the total frequency of positive words in word list s, found in media article i (press release j); 
and NEGi,s (NEGj,s) is the total frequency of negative words in word list s, found in media article 
i (press release j). Similar to Loughran and McDonald (2011b) and Huang et al. (2014), we 
consider negation for the positive words across all four dictionaries. If a negation word (no, not, 
none, neither, never, and nobody) occurs within three words preceding a positive word, we count 
the positive word as negative.7 We then construct the following tone measures for each trading 
day t: 





          (3) 
and 





          (4) 
where MATones (PRTones) is the mean of the tone scores of the media articles (press releases) 
issued on trading day t, based on word list s; and NMA (NPR) is the number of media articles (press 
releases) issued on trading day t. To arrive at a single overall tone measure of media articles 





       (5) 
and 
 
7 We do not account for negation for the negative word lists, as they are unlikely to occur (Loughran and McDonald 







        (6) 
Therefore, our tone measures are bounded between −1 and +1; a purely positive 
(negative) media article or press release would have a score of +1 (−1), while a perfectly neutral 
article or release would have a score of 0. 
 
3.2 Research Design 
We use the following models to test H1a and H1b and identify whether there is a significant 
positive relation between firm q’s tone of firm-initiated announcements and the tone of press-
initiated articles about firm q on trading day t, and whether the financial press attenuates the tone 
of firm q’s press releases issued on trading day t (omitting time and firm subscripts for 
simplicity): 
MAToneAVG = 𝛾0 + γ1PRToneAVG + γjCONTROLS + γkDAY +  γlMONTH + γmYEAR
+ γnFIRM + ε,                                                                                                              (7a) 
and 
MAToneAVG = 𝛾0 + γ1PRToneAVG + γ2PRDummyAVG + γ3PRToneAVG ∗ PRDummyAVG
+ γjCONTROLS + γkDAY + γlMONTH +  γmYEAR + γnFIRM        
+ ε,                                                                                                                                  (7b) 
where the dependent variable MAToneAVG is the tone of the financial performance-related media 
article(s) about firm q on trading day t; PRToneAVG is the tone of the financial performance-
related press release(s) issued by firm q on trading day t; and PRDummyAVG is an indicator 
variable that takes the value 1 if PRToneAVG is greater that its median value (by year-quarter) in 
the sample, and 0 otherwise. In order to test H1a, we estimate equation (7a) and predict a positive 
and significant coefficient for γ1, consistent with the information dissemination role of the 
media. A coefficient on PRToneAVG equal to one would suggest that financial journalists 




information. Thus, the view that the media attenuates the tone of corporate press releases is 
supported if the coefficient for γ1 is significantly less than one (H1b), while the inclusion of 
PRDummyAVG and the interaction term in equation (7b) also allows us to test whether this effect 
is more pronounced for more or less favourable firm announcements. CONTROLS is a vector 
of variables that controls for other factors that affect the tone of media articles about firm q on 
trading day t, DAY represents weekday fixed effects, MONTH represents month fixed effects, 
YEAR represents year fixed effects, FIRM represents firm fixed effects, and ε is the regression 
error term. 
Regarding hypotheses H2a and H2b, we model the market response to the economic news 
announced at the time of publication of the corporate press release and examine whether the 
unexplained component of media tone (i.e., abnormal media tone) is a significant determinant of 
the market reaction and whether it affects the strength of the relationship between press release 
tone and the market reaction. In particular, we estimate equation (8a) to examine whether the 
market reaction to the underlying event or information is related to the abnormal tone of financial 
media articles about firm q on trading day t after controlling for the tone of firm q’s corporate 
press release on the same day (time and firm subscripts are suppressed). In equation (8b), we 
also include the interaction term PRToneAVG * MARESIDAVG, which allows us to examine 
whether the media plays a moderating role, that is, whether abnormal media tone influences the 
relation between press release tone and market responses: 
ABRET (%) = 𝛾0 + γ1PRToneAVG + γ2MARESIDAVG + γjCONTROLS + γkDAY
+  γlMONTH + γmYEAR + γnFIRM + ε,                                                              (8a) 
and 
ABRET (%) = 𝛾0 + γ1PRToneAVG + γ2MARESIDAVG + γ3PRToneAVG ∗ MARESIDAVG
+ γjCONTROLS + γkDAY + γlMONTH +  γmYEAR + γnFIRM        




where the dependent variable ABRET (%) is the percentage abnormal returns on trading day t, 
measured as the difference between firm q’s stock returns and the returns on the S&P 500 index 
on media article and corporate disclosure day t, multiplied by 100; and MARESIDAVG is abnormal 
media tone, measured as the regression residual from equation (7a). CONTROLS is a vector of 
variables that controls for other factors that affect firm q’s abnormal returns on trading day t; and 
ε is the regression error term. All remaining variables are defined in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
To further support our conjectures on the relation between media articles’ and press 
releases’ tone, and their association with the corresponding market reaction to the underlying 
information content or news, we also re-estimate equations (7a), (7b), (8a) and (8b) using an 
alternative model specification based on industry fixed effects using the Fama and French (1997) 
48 industry classification (untabulated)8. In all models, we estimate robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. 
 
3.3 Press Releases and Financial Media Data 
We obtain data on financial performance-related corporate press releases and media articles 
about those releases between 2000 and 2013 from the Factiva database. Following Ahern and 
Sosyura (2014), Bushee and Miller (2012), Core et al. (2008), Engelberg (2008), Solomon (2012) 
and Soltes (2010), we employ Factiva’s intelligent indexing codes, that is, unique keys assigned 
to each firm by the database, to download media articles. In this way, we ensure that we identify 
only relevant articles that discuss a firm in sufficient detail, and not ones that simply mention the 
company’s name in passing. Similar to Ahern and Sosyura (2014) and Core et al. (2008), we 
collect English-language press-initiated articles included in Factiva’s category of Major News 
and Business Publications (intelligent indexing code: rst=tmnb), such as The Wall Street Journal 
 




and The New York Times, with the exception of press release wires through which firms initiate 
their disclosures. Hence, we collect articles from publications that exercise editorial control over 
their content (Bushee et al. 2010, Ahern and Sosyura 2014). We also apply Factiva’s expert 
search tool ‘Financial Performance’ to obtain financial performance-related media articles. 
Following Bushee and Miller (2012), Bushee et al. (2010) and Core et al. (2008), we 
assume that all articles carried on Factiva’s category of press release wires (intelligent indexing 
code: rst=tprw), such as PR Newswire and Business Wire, are company-initiated disclosures. 
Unlike these studies, we also include all articles coded as press releases by Factiva (intelligent 
indexing code: ns=npress). Taking into consideration that press releases almost always contain 
the issuing company’s name in the headline, we require the company’s name, or alternative 
names, to be included in the release’s headline. However, this procedure is not sufficient to 
determine whether a press release was issued by the company of interest. Similar to Soltes 
(2010), we also require the company’s name, or alternative names, or official website (if 
necessary), to be included in the contact (CT) field that is found at the bottom of each press 
release and contains the issuing company’s contact information.9 The use of the contact 
information allows us to accurately classify articles (Soltes 2010). We download financial 
performance-related firm-initiated disclosures through the application of ‘Financial 
Performance’ indexing (intelligent indexing code: ns=c15). In line with Ahern and Sosyura 
(2014), we eliminate corporate disclosures with fewer than 50 words as an additional filter of 
getting meaningful results.10 
 
9 We have noticed that most press releases issued in 2003 do not contain a separate contact field, probably because 
they were not mapped correctly when Factiva improved its contact mapping during the same year; instead, the 
releases display the contact information at the bottom of the main text prefixed with ‘CONTACT’. Consequently, 
in order to download press releases issued in 2003, we require at least one of the company’s name, alternative names, 
ticker or website to be included in the first five words following the word ‘CONTACT’ when the latter is found in 
the main text of the press release. 
10 For example, we locate press releases issued by International Business Machines Corporation, commonly referred 
to as IBM, through the following search: 
(rst=tprw OR ns=npress) AND wc>50 AND ns=c15 AND ((hd=International Business Machines) OR 
(hd=International Bus. Machines) OR (hd=IBM) OR (hd=Intnl Bus. Mach)) AND ((CT=International Business 




3.4 Sample Selection 
We consider all firms included in the Standard & Poor’s 500 index between years 2000 and 2013. 
Our focus on large U.S. companies is motivated by the fact that the S&P 500 index covers about 
three-quarters of the American equity market by capitalisation (Tetlock et al. 2008). 
Consequently, these firms appear in the news very often and this increases the importance of our 
analysis. Our sample covers the period from the year of introduction of Regulation Fair 
Disclosure, commonly referred to as Regulation FD or Reg FD, which is a regulation that was 
promulgated by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2000 and mandates that 
all publicly traded companies must disclose material information to all investors at the same 
time. In addition, we decide to begin our sample in 2000 because Factiva’s coverage is limited 
in earlier years (Ahern and Sosyura 2014). This gives us an initial sample of 282,406 financial 
performance-related media articles and 90,472 financial performance-related corporate 
disclosures collected from the Factiva database. From the initial 835 firms, we eliminate 4 double 
entries and 67 companies that are included in the S&P 500 index for less than 12 months. The 
application of these criteria yields a sample of 278,475 media articles and 87,835 corporate 
disclosures. We identify and remove 1,837 and 312 duplicate media articles and press releases, 
respectively, as well as 44,003 media articles and 8,183 press releases that are issued on a non-
trading day, or on a trading day for which full data are unavailable. To examine the effect of the 
tone of corporate disclosures on the tone of media articles, we further drop firm-day observations 
for which there is no financial press coverage, or no corporate disclosure. This process yields a 
final sample of 74,284 media articles and 27,281 press releases. The 736 companies left in our 
sample provide 24,535 firm-day observations from January 2000 to December 2013. 
 
The objective of the above free text search is to identify all financial performance-related press releases issued 
by International Business Machines Corporation, and not releases that simply mention the company’s name, or 





We obtain the data for our analysis from several sources, namely Factiva (press release 
and financial media data), Compustat (accounting data), CRSP (stock information), and I/B/E/S 
(analyst data). 
 
4. Results and Robustness Tests 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 shows that there is significant intra-week variation in the counts of media articles and 
press releases. The frequency of media articles per day increases from 7,505 (10.1%) on 
Mondays to 24,206 (32.6%) on Thursdays, followed by a decline to just 6,761 (9.1%) on Fridays. 
We observe a similar pattern for corporate disclosures. In line with DeHaan et al. (2015) and 
Dellavigna and Pollet (2009), we find that 32.6% (8.7%) of the firm disclosures in our sample 
are made on Thursdays (Fridays). In addition, according to the intra-year distribution of 
corporate disclosures, 57% of these disclosures occur during the months S&P 500 firms issue 
their quarterly reports, that is, January, April, July and October. Interestingly, almost 58% of the 
media articles are issued during the same months, a finding we interpret as evidence that the 
media follows the corporate quarterly reporting cycle, which is consistent with media focusing 
on newly released corporate information. Lastly, untabulated results show that the tone of media 
articles is on average lower than the tone of corporate announcements for almost all weekdays, 
months and years under examination. This finding is consistent with our conjecture that the 
media on average attenuates the tone of press releases. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Panel A of Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the raw values of key variables used 
in this study. The median (lower quartile, upper quartile) tone of corporate press releases is 0.252 
(0.074, 0.443) with a standard deviation of 28.1%, while the median (lower quartile, upper 
quartile) tone of the associated media articles is significantly lower with a value of 0.186 (−0.053, 




financial media attenuates the tone of corporate press releases (i.e., H1b) which is formally tested 
in the next section. During the sample period, the average earnings surprise is −0.018%, and 
approximately 11% of sample firms report negative earnings. The average (median) firm appears 
in 3.028 (2) financial media articles per trading day, has an abnormal return of 0.148% (0.063%), 
and is followed by 18.166 (18) analysts. 
Panel B of Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for the individual tone scores of our 
sample of 74,284 media articles and 27,281 firm disclosures. The mean and median values of 
PRToneLM, PRToneHenry, and PRToneDiction are, respectively, significantly more positive than the 
mean and median values of MAToneLM, MAToneHenry, and MAToneDiction. Therefore, the 
univariate mean and median differences of these tone measures are consistent with our 
supposition that corporate disclosures are, normally, significantly more positive in tone than the 
financial media articles about them. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
4.2 Pairwise Correlations 
Table 4 reports a positive and significant correlation between MAToneAVG and PRToneAVG 
(0.364), which is consistent with H1a, and reveals that there is a strong positive association 
between the tone of corporate press releases and the tone of financial media articles. We also 
find that ABRET is positively correlated with both tone measures but more highly so with 
MAToneAVG (0.146) than with PRToneAVG (0.051). This preliminary result attests to the fact that 
the tone in which media articles and press releases are written possibly conveys valuable 
information to market participants. Further, earnings surprise is significantly positively 
associated with both tone measures. Larger firms are also more positively correlated with 




coefficients are mostly under 0.50, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a concern in our 
sample.11 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
4.3 Main Results 
4.3.1 Test of Hypotheses 1a and 1b 
We investigate the monitoring role of the financial press by examining first the association 
between the tone of corporate disclosures and the tone of related financial media articles about 
firms’ financial performance. In Table 5, we estimate equations (7a) and (7b) and present the 
results of our multivariate regressions on the tone of press-initiated articles. In column 1, we 
report the results using OLS regression of MAToneAVG on PRToneAVG, with day, month, year, and 
firm fixed effects. The estimated coefficient on PRToneAVG (0.395) is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level (t-statistic = 24.06), suggesting that there is a significant positive 
association between the tone of firm-originated releases and that of press-generated articles. 
Consistent with our expectations in H1b, we also find that the coefficient on PRToneAVG is 
significantly less than one at the 1% level. In column 2, we include in the regression a set of 
control variables that, according to prior research, affect media tone, and show that our inferences 
remain the same. According to these regression results, media tone is lower for firms with high 
idiosyncratic volatility and book-to-market ratio. Leverage and share turnover do not have an 
effect on the tone of press-initiated articles. In column 3, we distinguish between the above-
median and the below-median tone scores of corporate disclosures by including the variable 
PRDummyAVG and the interaction between PRToneAVG and PRDummyAVG, and test how the press 
responds to different levels of the tone of firm-initiated disclosures (asymmetric effect). In the 
extreme case financial journalists simply disseminated the corporate disclosures without 
changing any of their content or adding any additional information, we would expect the 
 
11 Untabulated variance inflation factors (VIFs) are consistently less than 3, while 10 is the usual threshold suggested 




coefficient on PRToneAVG to be equal to one, and the coefficients on PRDummyAVG and the 
interaction term to be zero in magnitude. Our regression results show that the coefficients on the 
variables of interest are not only highly statistically different from zero, but also economically 
significant. Specifically, the coefficient on PRToneAVG is 0.514 (t-statistic = 19.66), while the 
coefficients on PRDummyAVG and PRToneAVG * PRDummyAVG are 0.128 (t-statistic = 9.97) and 
−0.324 (t-statistic = −8.51), respectively; increasing the below-median (above-median) tone of 
corporate disclosures by one, is predicted to increase, ceteris paribus, the tone of related press-
initiated articles about the firm by 0.514 (0.190). Therefore, our findings suggest that financial 
journalists attenuate the tone of firm-initiated disclosures. Even though the results hold both for 
above-median and below-median tone (i.e., more and less favourable disclosures, respectively), 
the significantly negative interaction term illustrates that the effect is asymmetric. In fact, we 
find that the financial press downplays the tone of overly favourable corporate disclosures more, 
which indicates the media’s efforts to offer balanced coverage in particular with respect to 
attenuating management’s exceedingly positive news disclosures. In column 4, we include in the 
regression the relevant control variables, and show that the results on the main variables of 
interest remain unchanged. The statistical and economic significance of the results in columns 
1-4 does not change when controlling for industry-specific time-invariant unobservable factors 
(untabulated). Overall, the regression results in Table 5 are consistent with hypotheses H1a and 
H1b. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
4.3.2 Test of Hypotheses 2a and 2b 
In Table 6, we estimate equations (8a) and (8b) to investigate the role of the financial press in 
the information transmission process relative to corporate announcements. We attempt to 
disentangle the association of corporate press release tone and abnormal media tone with the 




on the media coverage and corporate disclosure day.12 Specifically, in column 1, we examine the 
market reaction (ABRET) to the tone of corporate press releases (PRToneAVG) and abnormal 
media tone (MARESIDAVG), which is estimated as the residual component from the regression in 
column 2 of Table 5, and is our proxy for the tone of the new information generated by the media. 
In columns 2 to 4, we also include in the regressions the interaction term PRToneAVG * 
MARESIDAVG, which allows us to test whether the abnormal media tone moderates the relation 
between press release tone and market reaction. The four regression specifications we present in 
Table 6 are for the full sample (columns 1 and 2), and for subsamples of above-median (column 
3) and below-median (column 4) press release tone. All the regressions account for year, month, 
and day of the week fixed effects as well as for firm fixed effects; these effects capture constant 
time-specific and firm-specific factors not explicitly captured in the regression equations. Our 
results remain unchanged after controlling for industry (instead of firm) fixed effects 
(untabulated). 
In column 1 of Table 6, we find that the coefficient on PRToneAVG is positive and 
significant at the 1% level (coefficient = 0.926; t-statistic = 10.47), meaning that the tone of 
corporate press releases is positively associated with the market reaction to the underlying 
information content of the disclosures. This finding is in line with prior research suggesting that 
management-issued textual content has incremental information content.13 Importantly, we also 
find that the coefficient on MARESIDAVG is positive and significant at the 1% level (coefficient 
= 1.812; t-statistic = 21.13), suggesting that the unexplained component of media tone is 
incrementally informative to the market, consistent with hypothesis H2a. In fact, the coefficient 
on MARESIDAVG is significantly different from the coefficient on PRToneAVG at the 1% level 
 
12 Our findings remain robust to alternative windows of market reaction, such as the cumulative abnormal returns 
over the three-day window centered on the media coverage and corporate disclosure date. 
13 For example, Davis et al. (2012) use a sample of approximately 23,000 quarterly earnings press releases and 
report that the unexpected level of net optimistic language in earnings press releases is positively associated with 
market returns around the earnings announcement date. They conclude that market participants perceive managers’ 
language to be –at least to some extent− credible, despite managers’ potential incentives to disclose 
opportunistically. Similar to Davis et al. (2012), Demers and Vega (2014) analyse a sample of more than 20,000 




(untabulated), while the size of the coefficient on MARESIDAVG is also almost twice that of the 
coefficient on PRToneAVG, meaning that it is much more economically significant. In other 
words, consistent with the media providing original material information to the investment 
community, we provide evidence that the linguistic content of financial media articles is 
informative to market participants over and above that of corporate press releases. 
In column 2 of Table 6, after the inclusion of the interaction term, the economic and 
statistical significance of the coefficient on PRToneAVG (𝛾1) is relatively unchanged, while the 
coefficient on MARESIDAVG (𝛾2) remains positive and significant at the 1% level; consistent with 
our expectations, the coefficient on the interaction term (𝛾3) is significantly negative. The sum 
of the coefficients on PRToneAVG and the interaction term (i.e., 𝛾1+𝛾3) is equal to 0.494, which 
is significantly different from the coefficient on PRToneAVG, indicating that the residual 
component of media tone moderates the impact of press release tone on the market reaction to 
the news in the firm’s press release, consistent with our predictions in hypothesis H2b.14,15 
Therefore, we conclude that the role of corporate press release tone is weaker when abnormal 
media tone is higher. In other words, press release tone matters less to market participants when 
the tone of new information generated by the media is more positive. Overall, our findings are 
consistent with the abnormal media tone being informative itself and a significant driver of the 
market response to the news in the firm’s press release. An alternative, non-mutually exclusive 
explanation is that the abnormal media tone may just be reflective of the news in the press release 
and other economic news entering the market price on that day. A combination of both 
explanations is also possible.  
 
14 If we mean-centre PRToneAVG and MARESIDAVG (i.e., subtract the means from the values of the original variables 
so that they have a mean of 0), our results (untabulated) remain unchanged to those reported in Tables 5 and 6 
(Dawson 2014). 
15 The coefficient for the interaction term is also significantly negative when controlling for industry fixed effects 
(untabulated). Specifically, under a pooled OLS regression model specification, the coefficient for PRToneAVG is 
0.695 (t-statistic = 9.42), while the coefficients for MARESIDAVG and PRToneAVG * MARESIDAVG are 1.860 (t-




In columns 3 and 4, we estimate equation (8b) for above-median (i.e., PRDummyAVG = 
1) and below-median (PRDummyAVG = 0) press release tone subsamples, respectively. Although 
our findings are similar to the ones reported for the full-sample, we observe that the coefficient 
for the interaction term PRToneAVG * MARESIDAVG is only statistically significant for the above-
median press release tone subsample, suggesting that the media’s moderating effect exists only 
for considerably favourable corporate disclosures. 
To measure the incremental market response to managers’ and financial journalists’ 
language, we have collected data on and incorporated a range of control variables into the 
regressions in columns 1-4 in order to more cleanly isolate the informativeness of our tone 
measures to the market. The control variables that are known to have information content are 
analyst coverage (ANALYST), idiosyncratic volatility (VOLAT), firm size (SIZE), book-to-market 
ratio (BTM), leverage (LEV), share turnover (SHTURN), level of media coverage (MACOUNT), 
and an indicator variable that takes the value one if earnings per share are negative, and zero 
otherwise (LOSS). Consistent with existing literature, the coefficients on SIZE and LOSS are 
negative and significant at the 1% level, and the coefficients on VOLAT and BTM are positive 
and broadly statistically significant.  
In contrast to prior literature that examines the market reactions to the tone of 
management- and media-issued content independently, we find that the financial press plays a 
significant role in the information transmission process after controlling for firm disclosures, and 
hence offer direct evidence about the value of original press-issued information to market 
participants. Our results in Table 6 are consistent with H2a and H2b; thus, they contribute to the 
literature that examines the role of the media in financial markets by presenting evidence that 
supports its informative and moderating role. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
To visually examine this relation, Figure 1 displays the association between abnormal 




minimum, 25th percentile (i.e., Q1), median, 75th percentile (i.e., Q3), and maximum of the 
distribution of MARESIDAVG. In line with the previously reported findings, Figure 1 illustrates 
the moderating role of the financial media. In particular, we observe that abnormal media tone 
moderates the positive effect of press release tone on market reactions. The slope of the 
association between PRToneAVG and ABRET (%) becomes flatter as MARESIDAVG increases. It is 
worth noting that negative abnormal media tone (e.g., the minimum or Q1 of the distribution of 
MARESIDAVG) is associated with negative abnormal market reactions across all or almost all 
values of PRToneAVG. This finding is in line with prior research, suggesting that the market deems 
news stories in the business press as more credible than firms’ communications with the 
investment community (Kothari et al. 2009a). We also observe that the combination of highly 
negative (positive) corporate press release tone and highly negative (positive) abnormal media 
tone is associated with the highest negative (positive) abnormal market returns. In particular, 
ABRET (%) takes its lowest (highest) value, that is, −2.63% (1.85%), when PRToneAVG and 
MARESIDAVG are at their lowest (highest) values. Therefore, we extend the findings by Kothari 
et al. (2009b) of a general asymmetry in the market’s reaction to managers’ disclosure of positive 
and negative news, by showing that there is a similar asymmetric effect, with market participants 
reacting more (in magnitude) to highly negative news disclosed by the firm when it is 
accompanied by highly negative abnormal media tone compared to overly positive news 
announced by the firm when it is accompanied by overly positive abnormal media tone. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
4.4 Robustness and Supplemental Tests 
4.4.1 The Relation Between Media Article Tone and Corporate Press Release Tone: Earnings 
vs. Non-earnings Announcements 
We perform several robustness tests to examine the association between MAToneAVG and 
PRToneAVG, and the informativeness of both tone measures to market participants. First, the 




non-earnings release announcements, and related articles in the financial press. Given the 
prominence of earnings announcements in our sample, in Tables 7 and 8 we distinguish between 
earnings and other (non-earnings) announcements; this allows us to examine whether, and to 
what extent, the financial press attenuates the tone of both types of disclosures, and also to test 
for differences in the association between the market reaction and abnormal media tone for the 
two types of disclosures.  
 In Table 7 we examine earnings and non-earnings announcements separately (Panels A 
and B, respectively), and investigate the robustness of the results presented in Table 5. The vast 
majority of corporate press releases in the sample are earnings release announcements, which 
are highly anticipated and scrutinised disclosures. In contrast, about 30% of the corporate press 
releases in the sample are not related to earnings. These announcements are more prone to 
strategic reporting by managers (Segal and Segal, 2016). Consistent with our primary results, we 
find that there is a significant positive association between press release and media article tone 
both for earnings and non-earnings announcements. We also present evidence that the financial 
press attenuates the tone of both types of firm disclosures; this effect is asymmetric for both 
types, with the press mostly downplaying the tone of highly positive earnings and non-earnings 
announcements; this further indicates that financial journalists consider management’s 
favourable disclosures as less convincing. However, we observe that this effect is more 
pronounced for non-earnings disclosures relative to earnings announcements. This is intuitive 
and consistent with the monitoring role of the financial press given the evidence by Segal and 
Segal (2016) on managers’ tendency for strategic reporting in these announcements. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
4.4.2 The Relation between Abnormal Returns and Tone: Earnings vs. Non-earnings 
Announcements 
In Table 8, we investigate whether the market reaction to firm news correlates differently with 




textual content. In the analysis of the impact of abnormal media tone and press release tone on 
abnormal returns for the subset of earnings announcements, we can now control for the 
underlying earnings news contained in the earnings announcements. In other words, apart from 
controlling for the ‘soft’ information contained in the press releases (i.e., tone) as well as various 
firm characteristics, we now also control for the ‘hard’ (i.e., quantitative) information by 
including the variable EARNSURP (i.e., earnings surprise) in our regressions when examining 
earnings release announcements. EARNSURP is defined as: actual earnings per share minus 
analyst consensus (median) earnings forecast, both as reported by I/B/E/S, divided by stock price 
at the beginning of the quarter.16 Similar to our primary results, we show that the abnormal media 
tone is significantly associated with the market reaction to both earnings and non-earnings 
announcements. Nevertheless, the coefficient for the interaction term PRToneAVG * MARESIDAVG 
is statistically indistinguishable from zero when examining earnings release announcements, 
indicating that that there is no moderating effect by the media on the relation between earnings 
announcement tone and market reaction. In contrast, in line with the media playing a moderating 
role, the above coefficient remains economically and statistically significant when examining 
non-earnings announcements, particularly favourable ones. 
Last but not least, the distinction between earnings and non-earnings announcements in 
Table 8 helps towards disentangling the two alternative, non-mutually exclusive, explanations 
we provide for our full-sample results, namely that abnormal media tone is a driver of the market 
reaction to the news in the firm’s press release, and/or that it reflects the economic news 
contained in the firm’s press release. Arguably, the coefficient on EARNSURP in Panel A 
captures the impact of ‘hard’ earnings news contained in the earnings-related press releases on 
market reactions. In line with prior literature (e.g., Henry and Leone 2016), we find that the 
‘hard’ earnings news disseminated with the earnings announcement are significantly positively 
 
16 In untabulated tests, we show that our results are virtually identical when defining EARNSURP as: (actual earnings 




associated with the market reaction to the announcement. Still, the abnormal media article tone 
remains highly economically and statistically significant, which appears to be consistent with the 
media tone being a driver of the market reaction to the news in the firm’s press release. The fact 
that MARESIDAVG is significant after controlling for EARNSURP is in line with the information 
creation media role driving the market reactions.17 
Overall, our regression results on the earnings announcements subset are consistent with 
abnormal media tone being an important determinant of the market reaction to the news 
disseminated with the firm’s earnings release announcement. Still, we acknowledge that we 
cannot rule out the alternative explanation we offer, i.e., that the abnormal media tone reflects 
the economic news contained in the firm’s press release, for the entirety of our sample. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
4.4.3 Reverse Causality 
A potential concern with our conjecture that the financial media attenuates the tone of corporate 
press releases is that firms might disclose corporate information in response to media coverage, 
leading to reverse causality inferences. To investigate potential reverse causality, we obtain data 
on corporate disclosure and media article timings from the Factiva database. Factiva provides 
non-missing time stamps for more than 93% of our sample corporate disclosures and financial 
media articles. For each firm-day observation, we consider the time stamps of the firm 
announcement and the earliest related article in the financial press, and find that the corporate 
press release is issued before the media article about the firm for more than 85% of the 
observations. This indicates that reverse causality is not likely to explain our main results. As an 
additional robustness test, we exclude from our analysis firm-day observations, where the earliest 
media article about the firm is published before the corporate disclosure, and show that our 
 
17 We note that the inclusion of MARESIDAVG also materially improves the explanatory power of the regressions. 
More specifically, excluding the variables MARESIDAVG and the interaction term PRToneAVG * MARESIDAVG from 
the regression in column 2 of Table 8, Panel A, results in the R2 dropping to 0.006. The significant drop compared 
to the R2 reported in the table (R2 = 0.019) leads us to the conclusion that the inclusion of the above variables 




inferences remain unchanged (untabulated). Still, we decide to include these observations in our 
primary analysis due to potential leakages of information by the firm, as financial journalists 
may have private information and write a news story about an upcoming announcement. 
 
4.4.4 Alternative Tone Measures 
As discussed in Section 3.1.1, prior literature in accounting and finance has used both general 
purpose and domain-specific dictionaries in different contexts to measure document sentiment. 
In the main analyses, we construct and use average tone measures based on two general (Diction 
and LIWC) and two financial-customised (LM and Henry) dictionaries. In this section, we 
examine the robustness of our findings by employing dictionary-based tone measures that are 
calculated from the above ‘libraries’ of words separately. 
In untabulated analysis, we re-estimate equations (7a) and (7b) using tone measures based 
on each word list separately. Consistent with hypotheses H1a and H1b, all dictionaries show that 
there is a significant positive association between MATones and PRTones, where s equals LM, 
Henry, Diction, or LIWC, and that the financial press attenuates the tone of firm-initiated 
disclosures. In line with our primary results, our findings further demonstrate that the financial 
press downplays the above-median tone of firm disclosures more. In fact, based on the LIWC 
dictionary analysis, the media completely discounts the above-median tone of firm disclosures 
(i.e., more favourable disclosures). 
In addition, we examine the association between PRTones as well as MARESIDs and 
ABRET; similar to our findings in Table 6, the results of the alternative word lists indicate that 
the market reaction to the underlying news event is associated both with the unexplained 
component of media articles’ tone and the tone of corporate disclosures, and that MARESIDs 
moderates the impact of PRTones on market reactions for more favourable corporate disclosures. 




press, and the informativeness of media articles’ textual content to market participants− when 
using tone scores based on either financial domain-specific or general word lists. 
Lastly, the use of double-averaged tone measures in the primary analyses, as described 
in Section 3.1.2, could mechanically drive the positive (but below unity) association between 
MAToneAVG and PRToneAVG that we report in Table 5. Specifically, one could argue that our 
finding about the media attenuating the tone of corporate press releases is merely because our 
main measure of media articles’ tone reflects the consensus tone among financial journalists, 
since we use the average tone of all media articles published about the company on trading day 
t. To rule out this alternative explanation, when there are more than one media articles issued 
about firm q on trading day t, we consider only the earliest media article about the firm, and 
ignore all subsequent articles issued later during the day. We also do the same in the rare case of 
having multiple press releases issued by the firm in the same trading day. Untabulated results 
show that our primary results are unaffected by this sensitivity analysis both when using average 
tone measures based on LM, Henry, Diction and LIWC, and when using each of the above 
dictionaries separately, suggesting that our finding is not driven by the use of averages in tone 
scores. 
 
4.4.5 Propensity Score Matching Test 
In our analysis, we investigate the association between corporate disclosures’ and related 
financial media articles’ tone scores, and find that journalists publish articles that reflect but also 
attenuate the tone of firm announcements. However, it is plausible that the positive association 
between MAToneAVG and PRToneAVG simply reflects some confounding factors that determine 
both media article and press release tone, and does not demonstrate causality. In Table 9, we 
group firms on the basis of whether their disclosures were overly positive or highly negative 
using HIGHPRToneAVG, which is an indicator variable that equals 1 for the top decile of the 




A compares the results on media article tone scores across the two groups. The univariate 
statistics indicate that the mean and median MAToneAVG of firms that issued very positive 
corporate disclosures are significantly higher (p < 0.01) than those of firms that made very 
negative disclosures. This finding is in line with our primary results, and consistent with the idea 
that there is a positive association between the tone of management- and media-issued content. 
However, in Panel B, we present evidence that factors other than media article tone differ 
significantly across the two groups, including analyst coverage (ANALYST), idiosyncratic 
volatility (VOLAT), firm size (SIZE), book-to-market ratio (BTM), leverage (LEV), and share 
turnover (SHTURN). This raises concerns over the impact of these observable differences to our 
conclusions. To address the possibility that confounding factors might drive our main results, 
and to more clearly attribute observed differences in MAToneAVG to PRToneAVG itself, rather than 
to firm characteristics associated with firms’ disclosure tone, we employ a propensity score 
matching design (PSM). The intuition behind PSM is simple; we match observations from two 
groups (HIGHPRToneAVG = 1, and HIGHPRToneAVG = 0) on several dimensions using the 
estimated likelihood of receiving treatment (Shipman et al. 2017). Thus, we alleviate 
endogeneity concerns related to selection on observable characteristics. In addition, PSM has the 
advantage that it relaxes assumptions about the functional form of variable relations, and hence 
it reduces bias from functional form misspecification (Shipman et al. 2017). 
To implement this approach, we first fit a probit model in which the dependent variable 
is HIGHPRToneAVG (untabulated). The regressors include ANALYST, VOLAT, SIZE, BTM, LEV, 
SHTURN, and day of the week, month, year, and industry fixed effects. We then derive the 
propensity scores based on the above characteristics, and match (without replacement) each firm 
from the top decile of the distribution of PRToneAVG with another firm, in the same year and 
industry, from the bottom decile of the distribution of PRToneAVG that has the closest propensity 
score within a maximum distance of 1 percent. In other words, we use a nearest-neighbour 




includes 321 matched pairs. To ensure that these firms are similar across all observable 
dimensions except for the disclosure tone, we present, in Panel C, the covariate differences using 
the matched sample. There are no longer significant differences in the means and medians of any 
of the covariates across the two groups; this indicates proper covariate balance. In Panel D of 
Table 9, we compare the results on MAToneAVG across the two groups based on 
HIGHPRToneAVG, subsequent to propensity score matching. Paired t-tests and Wilcoxon 
matched pairs signed-rank tests lead us to the conclusion that the mean and median MAToneAVG 
of firms from the HIGHPRToneAVG = 1 group remain significantly higher (p < 0.01) than those 
of firms from the HIGHPRToneAVG = 0 group, suggesting a significant positive association 
between financial media article and corporate disclosure tone scores, a finding that is consistent 
with our main findings for H1a and H1b. Importantly, in Panel E, we re-estimate equations (7a) 
and (7b) using the matched sample, and find that our inferences remain the same; this indicates 
that our findings are unlikely to be driven by confounding effects. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
In this paper, we examine whether the financial press serves a monitoring role around corporate 
announcements. Using textual analysis, we explore the association between corporate disclosure 
and financial media article tone, and find support for the idea that the press not only disseminates 
corporate information but also interprets the tone of corporate disclosures by attenuating both 
the positive and negative tone of corporate press releases. Additionally, we show that the media 
downplays the tone of overly favourable disclosures to a greater extent, which serves as an 
indication that financial journalists view management disclosures containing highly positive tone 
with more scepticism compared to negative news announcements.  
 An alternative explanation to the above findings is that corporate press releases could 
systematically contain a mixture of stale and new information, while financial media articles are 




neutral relative to the tone of stale information, this would result in the appearance of an 
attenuation effect, when the correct conclusion should be that media articles focus on the new 
information in the corporate press releases. However, we have no reason to expect a priori the 
new content in the press releases to be systematically more neutral in tone than the stale content. 
We also find that the market reaction to the underlying event or information released at 
the time the company press release is issued is associated with the tone of new information 
generated by financial media articles after controlling for the tone of the content of firm-initiated 
disclosures. This suggests that the tone of new information produced by the media either is a 
driver of market reactions or reflects the news included in the press release and other economic 
news influencing the market price on that day, or both. An alternative interpretation of the above 
finding is that the market could be unwinding the (positive or negative) bias in corporate 
disclosures and the media articles respond to the market reaction instead of informing the market 
reaction. Furthermore, consistent with the idea that the media sensationalises news stories, the 
financial media could be negatively biasing corporate disclosures, with market participants 
reacting to this sensational negative news in the short-run. Although we acknowledge the above 
alternative explanations of our findings, we argue that they do not explain the entirety of our 
results. For example, in Section 4.4.2, we provide evidence in line with abnormal media tone 
being a driver of the market reaction to the news in the firm’s press release for a subset of our 
sample, thus, refuting the first alternative explanation. Moreover, in Table 5, we find that the 
media attenuates not only the positive but also the negative tone of corporate press releases, 
which is not consistent with the second alternative explanation based on the sensationalist view 
of the media. 
Overall, our findings add new evidence to a growing body of literature suggesting that 
the tone of press-originated articles contains incremental information content. Yet, our results 
may not be generalisable to the population of firms, as we examine large S&P 500 firms with a 




importance of the media in disseminating and analysing corporate press releases issued by firms 
with a different information environment (i.e., small or mid-sized firms). Future studies could 
also investigate the information creation and dissemination roles of the media by exploring 
whether greater media coverage or divergence in tone between corporate disclosures and 
financial media articles deters managers from using inflated tone in future press releases. In 
addition, taking into consideration recent advances in information technology, future research 
should seek to better understand alternative channels through which firms disseminate 
information to market participants. We view two particular issues as deserving of attention. First, 
future work should investigate whether investors’ preferences about how they receive 
information change over time, and whether the effects of information dissemination vary across 
different channels. Second, and relatedly, we would like to understand how the financial press 
interacts with other mechanisms, such as social media services, which also transmit firm news 
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The Relation between Abnormal Returns and Corporate Press Release Tone  
at Different Levels of Abnormal Media Tone 
 
Notes: Figure 1 displays the relation between abnormal returns and corporate press release tone at 
different levels of abnormal media tone. ABRET (%) is the percentage abnormal returns on trading 
day t, measured as the difference between firm q’s stock returns and the returns on the S&P 500 
index on media article and corporate disclosure day t, multiplied by 100. PRToneAVG is the average 
of PRToneLM, PRToneHenry, PRToneDiction and PRToneLIWC on trading day t. MARESIDAVG is abnormal 
media tone, measured as the regression residuals of equation (7a). Q1 and Q3 are the 25th and 75th 








Variable Definition and Measurement 
ABRET (%)q,t Firm q’s percentage abnormal returns on trading day t, measured as the 
difference between the firm’s stock returns and the returns on the S&P 500 
index on media article and corporate disclosure day t, multiplied by 100 
(Source: CRSP); 
ANALYSTq,t The number of analysts covering firm q as of the previous calendar quarter 
(Source: I/B/E/S); 
BTMq,t Firm q’s ratio of total assets to (total assets – book equity + market equity) 
as of the previous calendar quarter (Source: Compustat); 
EARNSURPq,t Firm q’s actual earnings per share minus analyst consensus earnings forecast 
scaled by stock price at the beginning of the quarter (Source: I/B/E/S, CRSP);   
HIGHPRToneAVG Indicator variable that takes the value 1 for the top decile of the distribution 
of PRToneAVG, and 0 for the bottom decile of the distribution of PRToneAVG; 
LEVq,t Firm q’s ratio of long- and short-term debt to total assets as of the previous 
calendar quarter (Source: Compustat); 
LOSSq,t Indicator variable that takes the value 1 if firm q’s earnings per share are 
negative, and 0 otherwise (Source: Compustat); 
MACOUNTq,t The number of media articles about firm q’s financial performance issued on 
trading day t (Source: Factiva); 
MADummyAVG Indicator variable that takes the value 1 if MAToneAVG is greater than its 
median value (by year-quarter) in the sample, and 0 otherwise; 
MARESIDAVG Abnormal media tone, measured as the regression residuals of equation (7a); 
MAToneAVG The average of MAToneLM, MAToneHenry, MAToneDiction and MAToneLIWC on 
trading day t; 
MAToneDiction (OPTIMISTIC – PESSIMISTIC) / (OPTIMISTIC + PESSIMISTIC), where 
OPTIMISTIC and PESSIMISTIC refer to the word count frequency in media 
article i issued on trading day t based on the optimistic (praise, satisfaction, 
and inspiration) and pessimistic (blame, hardship, and denial) words in the 
Diction 7.0 word list, respectively (Source: Factiva); 
MAToneHenry (POSITIVE – NEGATIVE) / (POSITIVE + NEGATIVE), where POSITIVE 
and NEGATIVE refer to the word count frequency in media article i issued 
on trading day t based on the positive and negative words in the Henry (2008) 
word list, respectively (Source: Factiva); 
MAToneLIWC (POSITIVE – NEGATIVE) / (POSITIVE + NEGATIVE), where POSITIVE 
and NEGATIVE refer to the word count frequency in media article i issued 
on trading day t based on the positive emotion and negative emotion words 
in the LIWC 2015 word list, respectively (Source: Factiva); 
MAToneLM (POSITIVE – NEGATIVE) / (POSITIVE + NEGATIVE), where POSITIVE 
and NEGATIVE refer to the word count frequency in media article i issued 
on trading day t based on the positive and negative words in the Loughran 
and McDonald (2011b) word list, respectively (Source: Factiva); 
PRDummyAVG Indicator variable that takes the value 1 if PRToneAVG is greater than its 
median value (by year-quarter) in the sample, and 0 otherwise; 




Table 1 (continued) 
Variable Definition and Measurement 
PRToneAVG The average of PRToneLM, PRToneHenry, PRToneDiction and PRToneLIWC on 
trading day t; 
PRToneDiction (OPTIMISTIC – PESSIMISTIC) / (OPTIMISTIC + PESSIMISTIC), where 
OPTIMISTIC and PESSIMISTIC refer to the word count frequency in press 
release j issued on trading day t based on the optimistic (praise, satisfaction, 
and inspiration) and pessimistic (blame, hardship, and denial) words in the 
Diction 7.0 word list, respectively (Source: Factiva); 
PRToneHenry (POSITIVE – NEGATIVE) / (POSITIVE + NEGATIVE), where POSITIVE 
and NEGATIVE refer to the word count frequency in press release j issued 
on trading day t based on the positive and negative words in the Henry (2008) 
word list, respectively (Source: Factiva); 
PRToneLIWC (POSITIVE – NEGATIVE) / (POSITIVE + NEGATIVE), where POSITIVE 
and NEGATIVE refer to the word count frequency in press release j issued 
on trading day t based on the positive emotion and negative emotion words 
in the LIWC 2015 word list, respectively (Source: Factiva); 
PRToneLM (POSITIVE – NEGATIVE) / (POSITIVE + NEGATIVE), where POSITIVE 
and NEGATIVE refer to the word count frequency in press release j issued 
on trading day t based on the positive and negative words in the Loughran 
and McDonald (2011b) word list, respectively (Source: Factiva); 
SHTURNq,t Firm q’s ratio of the total number of shares traded to the total number of 
shares outstanding as of the previous calendar quarter (Source: Compustat); 
SIZEq,t The natural logarithm of firm q’s market value of equity as of the previous 
calendar quarter (Source: Compustat); and 
VOLATq,t The natural logarithm of the standard deviation of firm q’s ABRET in the last 






Counts of Media Articles and Press Releases by Calendar Period 
 
Number of Media Articles and Press Releases per Day of the Week 
 Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Total 
Media Articles 7,505 18,341 17,471 24,206 6,761 74,284 
Press Releases 2,931 6,483 6,605 8,881 2,381 27,281 
 
Number of Media Articles and Press Releases per Month of Publication 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total 
Media Articles 10,057 6,874 2,815 10,745 4,478 2,334 10,848 4,527 2,440 11,252 5,143 2,771 74,284 
Press Releases 3,457 2,670 1,070 3,967 1,680 861 3,960 1,621 946 4,179 1,806 1,064 27,281 
 
Number of Media Articles and Press Releases per Year of Publication 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Media Articles 994 3,950 5,426 4,782 7,087 7,344 5,140 4,908 4,941 5,593 6,087 5,177 7,316 5,539 74,284 
Press Releases 474 1,765 2,020 2,018 2,526 2,642 2,042 2,075 2,234 2,155 1,826 1,734 2,069 1,701 27,281 
Notes: The table presents counts of media articles and press releases by day, month and year of publication. Our sample includes 74,284 media articles and 
27,281 press releases related to companies’ financial performance from the Factiva database for the Standard and Poor’s 500 index constituent firms over the 







Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for the Regression Sample 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
MAToneAVG 24,535 0.185 0.332 −0.053 0.186 0.425 
PRToneAVG 24,535 0.263 0.281 0.074 0.252 0.443 
MARESIDAVG 24,535 0.000 0.293 −0.198 0.004 0.200 
ANALYST 24,535 18.166 7.852 13.000 18.000 23.000 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 24,535 0.019 0.013 0.011 0.016 0.023 
Market Capitalisation (in millions) 24,535 27,731 49,910 4,920 10,479 25,542 
BTM 24,535 0.650 0.270 0.432 0.638 0.878 
LEV 24,535 0.245 0.168 0.121 0.233 0.343 
SHTURN 24,535 0.654 0.530 0.316 0.492 0.799 
ABRET (%) 24,535 0.148 3.267 −1.644 0.063 1.944 
MACOUNT 24,535 3.028 2.893 1.000 2.000 4.000 
LOSS 24,535 0.114 0.317 0.000 0.000 0.000 
EARNSURP (%) 17,061 −0.018 3.177 0.000 0.048 0.154 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for the Alternative Tone Measures 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
MAToneLM 24,535 −0.193 0.461 −0.534 −0.222 0.100 
MAToneHenry 24,535 0.348 0.404 0.077 0.400 0.656 
MAToneDiction 24,535 0.086 0.486 −0.250 0.085 0.429 
MAToneLIWC 24,535 0.501 0.308 0.302 0.529 0.733 
PRToneLM 24,535 −0.022 0.433 −0.329 −0.059 0.231 
PRToneHenry 24,535 0.448 0.321 0.255 0.484 0.667 
PRToneDiction 24,535 0.144 0.394 −0.111 0.135 0.406 
PRToneLIWC 24,535 0.483 0.270 0.318 0.490 0.647 
Notes: The table describes characteristics of firms in our sample. Panels A and B report descriptive statistics for 
the raw values of key variables, and for the alternative tone measures, respectively. BTM, LEV and SHTURN are 
winsorised at 99%. ABRET and EARNSURP are winsorised at 1% and 99%. The sample size for each variable is 
24,535 firm-day observations (EARNSURP has 17,061 firm-day observations); Q1 is the 25th percentile; Q3 is the 





 Correlation Matrix for the Regression Sample  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
              
1 MAToneAVG 1.000            
2 PRToneAVG 0.364*** 1.000           
3 ANALYST 0.002 −0.001 1.000          
4 VOLAT −0.282*** −0.170*** −0.055*** 1.000         
5 SIZE 0.102*** 0.188*** 0.513*** −0.377*** 1.000        
6 BTM −0.228*** −0.166*** −0.176*** 0.073*** −0.204*** 1.000       
7 LEV −0.048*** 0.019*** −0.222*** −0.005 −0.061*** 0.249*** 1.000      
8 SHTURN −0.167*** −0.178*** 0.137*** 0.542*** −0.291*** 0.053*** −0.033*** 1.000     
9 ABRET 0.146*** 0.051*** −0.013** 0.017*** −0.012* 0.002 −0.005 0.006 1.000    
10 MACOUNT 0.022*** 0.005 0.212*** −0.125*** 0.351*** −0.024*** 0.020*** −0.045*** −0.008 1.000   
11 LOSS −0.255*** −0.187*** −0.059*** 0.346*** −0.215*** 0.224*** 0.089*** 0.251*** −0.045*** −0.062*** 1.000  
12 EARNSURP 0.054*** 0.041*** 0.024*** −0.116*** 0.048*** −0.034*** −0.037*** −0.061*** 0.045*** 0.009 −0.080*** 1.000 
              
Notes: The table presents Pearson correlation coefficients. BTM, LEV and SHTURN are winsorised at 99%. ABRET and EARNSURP are winsorised at 1% and 99%. The 
sample size for each variable is 24,535 firm-day observations (EARNSURP has 17,061 firm-day observations). The asterisks indicate a 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) 





The Relation between Media Article Tone and Corporate Press Release Tone 
Dependent Variable: 
MAToneAVG 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
PRToneAVG 0.395*** 0.362*** 0.514*** 0.469*** 
 (24.06) (23.56) (19.66) (19.43) 
PRDummyAVG   0.128*** 0.111*** 
   (9.97) (8.90) 
PRToneAVG * PRDummyAVG   −0.324*** −0.283*** 
   (−8.51) (−7.75) 
ANALYST  −0.002***  −0.002*** 
  (−2.79)  (−2.60) 
VOLAT  −0.101***  −0.099*** 
  (−12.15)  (−11.98) 
SIZE  −0.001  −0.005 
  (−0.17)  (−0.61) 
BTM  −0.337***  −0.332*** 
  (−13.42)  (−13.14) 
LEV  −0.040  −0.043 
  (−1.21)  (−1.32) 
SHTURN  0.004  0.006 
  (0.50)  (0.74) 
Intercept 0.061*** −0.039 0.048** −0.017 
 (2.95) (−0.48) (2.34) (−0.21) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year, Month, Day of Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.197 0.228 0.210 0.237 
Observations 24,535 24,535 24,535 24,535 
Notes: The table presents regression results on the relation between media article tone 
and corporate press release tone. The dependent variable, MAToneAVG, is the average of 
MAToneLM, MAToneHenry, MAToneDiction, and MAToneLIWC on trading day t. All remaining 
variables are defined in Table 1. Firm, year, month, and day of the week fixed effects are 
included in all regressions (coefficients not reported). BTM, LEV and SHTURN are 
winsorised at 99%. The t-statistics are in parentheses. The asterisks indicate a 1% (***), 





The Relation between Abnormal Returns and Tone 
Dependent Variable: 
ABRET (%) 
 (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
     PRDummyAVG=1 PRDummyAVG=0 
PRToneAVG  0.926*** 0.900***   0.866*** 0.836*** 
  (10.47) (10.14)   (5.49) (3.54) 
MARESIDAVG  1.812*** 1.927***   2.445*** 1.868*** 
  (21.13) (17.71)   (8.77) (15.40) 
PRToneAVG * MARESIDAVG   −0.406*   −1.381*** −0.369 
   (−1.87)   (−3.08) (−0.69) 
ANALYST  −0.012* −0.012*   −0.011 −0.010 
  (−1.90) (−1.92)   (−1.29) (−1.12) 
VOLAT  0.210** 0.205**   0.467*** 0.090 
  (2.20) (2.16)   (3.35) (0.65) 
SIZE  −0.404*** −0.403***   −0.453*** −0.374*** 
  (−5.17) (−5.16)   (−3.83) (−3.24) 
BTM  0.416* 0.408*   0.749** 0.344 
  (1.69) (1.66)   (2.17) (0.96) 
LEV  −0.130 −0.134   0.097 −0.202 
  (−0.41) (−0.42)   (0.21) (−0.44) 
SHTURN  −0.095 −0.095   −0.358** 0.059 
  (−0.86) (−0.86)   (−2.10) (0.42) 
MACOUNT  −0.007 −0.007   0.023** −0.035*** 
  (−0.96) (−0.88)   (2.27) (−2.71) 
LOSS  −0.430*** −0.429***   −0.513*** −0.419*** 
  (−4.53) (−4.51)   (−3.42) (−3.46) 
Intercept  4.295*** 4.294***   5.809*** 3.459*** 
  (4.90) (4.90)   (4.33) (2.70) 
Firm FE  Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Year, Month, Day of Week FE  Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
R2  0.019 0.020   0.018 0.022 
Observations  24,535 24,535   12,251 12,284 
Notes: The table presents regression results on the relation between abnormal returns and tone. The dependent variable, ABRET (%), is the percentage abnormal 
returns on trading day t, measured as the difference between firm q’s stock returns and the returns on the S&P 500 index on media article and corporate 




regressions (coefficients not reported). BTM, LEV and SHTURN are winsorised at 99%. ABRET is winsorised at 1% and 99%. The t-statistics are in parentheses. 







The Relation between Media Article Tone and Corporate Press Release Tone: Earnings and Non-earnings Announcements 




(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
  
PRToneAVG  0.638*** 0.573*** 0.698*** 0.615***  0.300*** 0.289*** 0.346*** 0.341*** 
  (32.04) (29.38) (24.43) (21.89)  (16.27) (16.39) (10.12) (10.34) 
PRDummyAVG    0.050*** 0.038**    0.092*** 0.086*** 
    (3.09) (2.52)    (4.58) (4.26) 
PRToneAVG * PRDummyAVG    −0.159*** −0.117***    −0.174*** −0.173*** 
    (−3.39) (−2.61)    (−3.51) (−3.53) 
ANALYST   −0.002**  −0.002**   −0.001  −0.001 
   (−2.41)  (−2.41)   (−1.14)  (−1.00) 
VOLAT   −0.087***  −0.086***   −0.111***  −0.111*** 
   (−9.47)  (−9.39)   (−7.46)  (−7.45) 
SIZE   −0.006  −0.008   −0.017  −0.016 
   (−0.78)  (−0.95)   (−1.25)  (−1.20) 
BTM   −0.323***  −0.324***   −0.281***  −0.275*** 
   (−11.98)  (−12.02)   (−6.39)  (−6.22) 
LEV   −0.020  −0.022   −0.047  −0.054 
   (−0.59)  (−0.63)   (−0.83)  (−0.97) 
SHTURN   0.000  0.001   0.002  0.004 
   (0.03)  (0.13)   (0.13)  (0.23) 
Intercept  0.010 0.002 0.007 0.017  0.013 −0.010 0.005 −0.029 
  (0.42) (0.02) (0.30) (0.19)  (0.37) (−0.07) (0.13) (−0.20) 
Firm FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year, Month, Day of Week FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2  0.267 0.285 0.269 0.287  0.141 0.175 0.147 0.178 
Observations  17,061 17,061 17,061 17,061  7,474 7,474 7,474 7,474 
Notes: The table presents regression results on the relation between media article tone and corporate press release tone for the earnings and non-earnings 
announcement subsamples (Panels A and B, respectively). The dependent variable in both Panels, MAToneAVG, is the average of MAToneLM, MAToneHenry, 
MAToneDiction, and MAToneLIWC on trading day t. All remaining variables are defined in Table 1. Firm, year, month, and day of the week fixed effects are 
included in all regressions (coefficients not reported). BTM, LEV and SHTURN are winsorised at 99%. The t-statistics are in parentheses. The asterisks 






The Relation between Abnormal Returns and Tone: Earnings and Non-earnings Announcements 
  Panel A: Earnings Announcements   Panel B: Non-earnings Announcements 
Dependent Variable: 
ABRET (%) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
   PRDummyAVG=1 PRDummyAVG=0    PRDummyAVG=1 PRDummyAVG=0 
PRToneAVG  1.075*** 1.087*** 1.358*** 1.330***  1.040*** 1.015*** 0.550* 0.897*** 
  (6.77) (6.85) (4.06) (3.85)  (8.86) (8.57) (1.87) (3.01) 
MARESIDAVG  1.899*** 1.818*** 1.863*** 1.886***  1.612*** 1.820*** 2.244*** 1.789*** 
  (17.01) (11.68) (3.72) (11.19)  (12.95) (11.11) (4.60) (9.90) 
PRToneAVG * MARESIDAVG   0.342 0.285 −0.867   −0.620** −1.525** 0.090 
   (0.82) (0.28) (−0.90)   (−2.20) (−2.21) (0.13) 
ANALYST  −0.007 −0.007 0.004 −0.009  −0.018 −0.018 −0.008 −0.024 
  (−0.86) (−0.87) (0.32) (−0.86)  (−1.38) (−1.42) (−0.51) (−1.25) 
VOLAT  0.332*** 0.334*** 0.555*** 0.275*  0.182 0.175 0.595** −0.179 
  (2.82) (2.84) (3.05) (1.68)  (1.04) (1.00) (2.54) (−0.67) 
SIZE  −0.556*** −0.555*** −0.879*** −0.429***  −0.308* −0.305* −0.046 −0.484* 
  (−6.49) (−6.49) (−6.32) (−3.38)  (−1.76) (−1.74) (−0.21) (−1.79) 
BTM  0.544* 0.547* 0.549 0.626  −0.387 −0.392 0.527 −1.028 
  (1.78) (1.79) (1.20) (1.51)  (−0.90) (−0.91) (0.87) (−1.58) 
LEV  −0.209 −0.211 −0.593 −0.126  0.192 0.173 0.622 0.038 
  (−0.53) (−0.53) (−1.08) (−0.22)  (0.32) (0.29) (0.77) (0.05) 
SHTURN  −0.058 −0.057 −0.253 0.065  −0.239 −0.235 −0.542** 0.174 
  (−0.43) (−0.42) (−1.09) (0.38)  (−1.20) (−1.18) (−2.34) (0.56) 
MACOUNT  0.002 0.002 0.019 −0.015  −0.007 −0.007 0.072*** −0.070** 
  (0.21) (0.20) (1.36) (−0.92)  (−0.39) (−0.36) (2.91) (−2.41) 
LOSS  −0.292** −0.291** −0.500** −0.239*  −0.622*** −0.619*** −0.725*** −0.595*** 
  (−2.48) (−2.48) (−2.12) (−1.70)  (−3.92) (−3.89) (−3.23) (−2.67) 
EARNSURP  5.976** 5.947** 6.162 5.598*      
  (2.14) (2.13) (1.26) (1.71)      
Intercept  6.235*** 6.240*** 10.021*** 4.723***  3.369* 3.331* 2.262 3.909 
  (6.39) (6.40) (6.09) (3.30)  (1.82) (1.80) (0.89) (1.45) 
Firm FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year, Month, Day of Week FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2  0.019 0.019 0.017 0.023  0.033 0.035 0.031 0.032 




Notes: The table presents regression results on the relation between abnormal returns and tone for the earnings and non-earnings announcement subsamples (Panels A and B, 
respectively). The dependent variable in both Panels, ABRET (%), is the percentage abnormal returns on trading day t, measured as the difference between firm q’s stock returns 
and the returns on the S&P 500 index on media article and corporate disclosure day t, multiplied by 100. All remaining variables are defined in Table 1. Firm, year, month, and 
day of the week fixed effects are included in all regressions (coefficients not reported). BTM, LEV and SHTURN are winsorised at 99%. ABRET and EARNSURP are winsorised 







Comparison between Firms with High PRToneAVG and Firms with Low PRToneAVG 
Panel A: Prior to propensity score matching, differences in MAToneAVG across groups based on HIGHPRToneAVG 
 HIGHPRToneAVG = 1 (N = 2,454)  HIGHPRToneAVG = 0 (N = 2,454)  Standardised Differences  Differences (1 – 0) 
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev.  Mean Median Std. Dev.  (%)  Mean Median 
MAToneAVG 0.317 0.325 0.345  −0.075 −0.108 0.306  120.45  0.393*** 0.433*** 
 
Panel B: Prior to propensity score matching, differences in covariates across groups based on HIGHPRToneAVG 
 HIGHPRToneAVG = 1 (N =2,454)  HIGHPRToneAVG = 0 (N = 2,454)  Standardised Differences  Differences (1 – 0) 
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev.  Mean Median Std. Dev.  (%)  Mean Median 
ANALYST 19.406 19.000 7.912  18.559 18.000 8.360  10.41  0.847*** 1.000*** 
VOLAT −4.188 −4.244 0.498  −3.872 −3.916 0.576  −58.64  −0.316*** −0.328*** 
SIZE 9.906 9.795 1.300  8.911 8.926 1.316  76.04  0.995*** 0.869*** 
BTM 0.620 0.598 0.266  0.740 0.757 0.279  −44.11  −0.120*** −0.159*** 
LEV 0.255 0.247 0.160  0.236 0.217 0.179  11.29  0.019*** 0.029*** 
SHTURN 0.560 0.421 0.468  0.884 0.663 0.702  −54.30  −0.324*** −0.242*** 
 
Panel C: Subsequent to propensity score matching, differences in covariates across groups based on HIGHPRToneAVG 
 HIGHPRToneAVG = 1 (N = 321)  HIGHPRToneAVG = 0 (N = 321)  Standardised Differences  Differences (1 – 0) 
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev.  Mean Median Std. Dev.  (%)  Mean Median 
ANALYST 21.041 21.000 7.374  21.178 21.000 8.234  −1.75  −0.137 0.000 
VOLAT −4.062 −4.112 0.515  −4.062 −4.155 0.539  −0.08  −0.000 0.043 
SIZE 9.531 9.508 1.107  9.487 9.465 1.062  4.07  0.044 0.043 
BTM 0.672 0.685 0.260  0.648 0.630 0.284  8.98  0.024 0.055 
LEV 0.217 0.195 0.159  0.215 0.172 0.190  1.10  0.002 0.024 





Panel D: Subsequent to propensity score matching, differences in MAToneAVG across groups based on HIGHPRToneAVG 
 HIGHPRToneAVG = 1 (N = 321)  HIGHPRToneAVG = 0 (N = 321)  Standardised Differences  Differences (1 – 0) 
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev.  Mean Median Std. Dev.  (%)  Mean Median 
MAToneAVG 0.275 0.268 0.346  0.027 −0.009 0.334  72.89  0.248*** 0.278*** 
 
Panel E: Subsequent to propensity score matching, Firm FE models estimated for MAToneAVG 
Dependent Variable: 
MAToneAVG (1) (2) 
PRToneAVG 0.217*** 0.860*** 
 (5.46) (4.10) 
PRDummyAVG  0.159 
  (0.81) 
PRToneAVG * PRDummyAVG  −1.044*** 
  (−3.78) 
ANALYST 0.000 −0.001 
 (0.06) (−0.10) 
VOLAT −0.119** −0.107** 
 (−2.50) (−2.23) 
SIZE −0.054 −0.040 
 (−1.06) (−0.77) 
BTM −0.653*** −0.647*** 
 (−4.00) (−3.92) 
LEV −0.154 −0.240 
 (−0.93) (−1.43) 
SHTURN −0.054 −0.063 
 (−1.29) (−1.53) 
Intercept 0.443 0.566 
 (0.76) (0.97) 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
Year, Month, Day of Week FE Yes Yes 
R2 0.179 0.198 










, where ?̅?gr1 (𝑠𝑔𝑟1
2 ) is the sample mean (variance) in the HIGHPRToneAVG = 1 group and ?̅?gr0 (𝑠𝑔𝑟0
2 ) is the sample mean (variance) in the 
HIGHPRToneAVG = 0 group. Standardised differences > 20 or < –20 indicate large differences (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983, Ferri and Maber 2013, 
Hooghiemstra et al. 2015). Two-sample t-tests (Wilcoxon two-sample rank-sum tests) are used to test differences in means (differences in medians). The 
asterisks indicate a 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level of significance. All variables are defined in Table 1. Panel B compares the results on covariates 





, where ?̅?gr1 (𝑠𝑔𝑟1
2 ) is the sample mean (variance) in the 
HIGHPRToneAVG = 1 group and ?̅?gr0 (𝑠𝑔𝑟0
2 ) is the sample mean (variance) in the HIGHPRToneAVG = 0 group. Standardised differences > 20 or < –20 
suggest large differences (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983, Ferri and Maber 2013, Hooghiemstra et al. 2015). Two-sample t-tests (Wilcoxon two-sample rank-
sum tests) are used to test differences in means (differences in medians). BTM, LEV and SHTURN are winsorised at 99%. The asterisks indicate a 1% 
(***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level of significance. All variables are defined in Table 1. Panel C compares the results on covariates based on 





, where ?̅?gr1 (𝑠𝑔𝑟1
2 ) is 
the sample mean (variance) in the HIGHPRToneAVG = 1 group and ?̅?gr0 (𝑠𝑔𝑟0
2 ) is the sample mean (variance) in the HIGHPRToneAVG = 0 group. Standardised 
differences < 20 and > –20 are commonly viewed as indicating a good match (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983, Ferri and Maber 2013, Hooghiemstra et al. 
2015). Paired t-tests (Wilcoxon matched pairs signed-rank tests) are used to test differences in means (differences in medians). BTM, LEV and SHTURN 
are winsorised at 99%. The asterisks indicate a 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level of significance. All variables are defined in Table 1. Panel D 
compares the results on MATONEAVG across groups based on HIGHPRToneAVG, subsequent to propensity score matching. The standardised difference in 





, where ?̅?gr1 (𝑠𝑔𝑟1
2 ) is the sample mean (variance) in the HIGHPRToneAVG = 1 group and ?̅?gr0 (𝑠𝑔𝑟0
2 ) is the sample 
mean (variance) in the HIGHPRToneAVG = 0 group. Standardised differences > 20 or < –20 indicate large differences (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983, Ferri 
and Maber 2013, Hooghiemstra et al. 2015). Paired t-tests (Wilcoxon matched pairs signed-rank tests) are used to test differences in means (differences 
in medians). The asterisks indicate a 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level of significance. All variables are defined in Table 1. Panel E reports the results 
of Firm Fixed Effects models estimated for MAToneAVG, subsequent to propensity score matching. The dependent variable, MAToneAVG, is the average of 
MAToneLM, MAToneHenry, MAToneDiction, and MAToneLIWC on trading day t. All remaining variables are defined in Table 1. Firm, year, month, and day of 
the week fixed effects are included in all regressions (coefficients not reported). BTM, LEV and SHTURN are winsorised at 99%. The t-statistics are in 
parentheses. The asterisks indicate a 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level of significance. All standard errors are clustered at firm level. 
